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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Michael Detwiler appeals his convictions for aggravated assault and aggravated 
battery, contending that there were three different errors which occurred during his trial 
and sentencing, each of which necessitates a remand of this case. First, he asserts 
that there was a fatal variance between the charging information and the jury instruction 
as to the aggravated assault charge. Second, he contends that the district court 
erroneously declined to give his proposed instruction on the necessity defense. Third, 
Mr. Detwiler asserts that the district court abused its discretion by refusing to allow him 
to challenge the information included in the presentence investigation report 
(hereinafter, PSI) as unreliable or by refusing to redline that information from the PSI at 
the sentencing hearing. 
As such, this Court should vacate the judgment of conviction and remand this 
case for a new trial, or should, at least, vacate the sentence and remand for a new 
sentencing hearing following an adequate opportunity for Mr. Detwiler to challenge the 
information in the PSI. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Mr. Detwiler encountered a group of men, including Anthony "Kalani" Storch, at 
Buster's Bar and Grill in Boise. He tried to engage them in conversation, but they were 
not interested, and brushed him off. (Tr., Vol.4, p.190, L.17 - p.191, L.9.)1 Mr. Detwiler 
1 The transcripts in this case are provided in five independently bound and paginated 
volumes. To avoid confusion, "Vol.1" will refer to the volume containing the transcript of 
the preliminary hearing, provided in the electronic document "DETWILER prelim." 
"Vol.2" will refer to the volume containing the transcript of the April 21, 2011 hearing on 
the State's motion to continue. "Vol.3" will refer to the volume containing the transcript 
of the motion in limine hearing held on May 19, 2011. "Vol.4" will refer to the volume 
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did not react well to their disinterest, and became upset, ultimately shouting some racial 
epitaphs at people in the bar. (Tr., Vol.4, p:191, L 12 - p.192, L.3.) The bartender, 
Ashley Haynes, asked Mr. Detwiler to leave the establishment. (Tr., Vol.4, p.195, 
Ls.6-17) Mr. Detwiler gathered his belongings, and Ms. Haynes escorted him out. 
(Tr., Vol.4, p.197, Ls.8-15; Tr., Vol.4, p.381, Ls.5-1 ) Mr. Detwiler got into his car and 
prepared to leave. (Tr., Vol.4, p.383, Ls.12-14.) However, before he was able to do so, 
another group of men approached his car, and tried to get him out of the car. 
(Tr., Vol.4, p.383, L.14 - p.384, L.5.) One of them even kicked his driver side door. 
(Tr., Vol.4, p.384, Ls.8-1 O; see also Tr., Vol.4, p.342, Ls.15-17 (one of the officers 
testifying that "[i]t appears that there was some sort of footprint or scuff from a shoe or a 
boot on the door"). 
Ms. Haynes came back out, followed by Mr. Storch and other members of his 
group, to make sure that Mr. Detwiler was safe to be driving. (Tr., Vol.4, p.198, 
Ls.21 - p.200, Ls.1 )) She saw the group of men around Mr. Detwiler's car, and believed 
it would not have been safe for him to get out of the car. (Tr., Vol.4, p.260, Ls.12-16.) 
She was able to get the group of men to back off for the moment, and speak to 
Mr. Detwiler through the driver's door, which he had opened for her. (Tr., Vol.4, p.201, 
Ls. 17-24.) After a short conversation, he tried to leave, closing the door before 
Ms. Haynes could get out of the way, catching her against the door jamb, though she 
was able to get free of the car without further incident. (Tr., Vol.4, p.202, Ls.4-14.) 
Ms. Haynes testified that, while she was sore after the encounter, it was not anything 
that would cause her seek medical attention. (Tr., Vol.4 p.262, L 11 - p.263, L.1.) 
containing the transcripts of the jury trial. "Vol.5" will refer to the volume containing the 
transcript of the sentencing hearing held on August 4, 2011. 
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Mr. Detwiler testified that, in the meantime, his assailants had returned, and one 
of them had managed to get his driver side door open again, and was trying to drag him 
out of the car. (Tr., Vol.4, 386, Ls.9-14.) This frightened Mr. Detwiler because he was 
concerned that, if he ended up in a fight, it could cause serious damage, as he was still 
recovering from a head injury received a few months prior, which had resulted in the 
removal of part of his skull. (Tr., Vol.4, p.367, L.17 - p.369, L.3 (Mr. Detwiler explaining 
the head injury); Tr., Vol.4, p.384, Ls.11-17 (Mr. Detwiler explaining his fear during the 
encounter).) He tried to drive away in reverse, but that did not work. (Tr., Vol.4, p.386, 
Ls.14-16.) Mr. Detwiler then tried driving his car forward, hoping that would allow him to 
get the door closed and activate the car's automatic door-locking function. (Tr., Vol.4, 
p.386, L.·17 - p.387, L.2.) Mr. Starch's friend saw the car start moving toward Mr. Storch 
and Ms. Haynes and called a warning to them. (Tr., Vol.4, p.308, Ls.11-16.) While 
Ms. Haynes was able to get out of the way, Mr. Storch was hit by the car. ( See, e.g., 
Tr., Vol.4, p.206, L.6 - p.207, L.5.) 
Luckily, Mr. Storch was thrown clear when the car stopped a few feet later. 
(Tr., Vol.4, p.309, Ls.1-4.) According to Mr. Storch, the only injury he received from that 
incident was a twisted hip. (Tr., Vol.4, p.316, L.17 - p.317, L.21.) Some patio furniture 
was also damaged at some point in the proceedings, but there was testimony that some 
of that damage may have resulted from Mr. Storch and/or others throwing patio chairs 
at Mr. Detwiler's car. (Tr., Vol.4, p.210, Ls.11-13 (Ms. Haynes describing the damage); 
Tr. Vol.4, p.209, Ls.6-18 (Ms. Haynes testifying that she saw a chair thrown, but unable 
to identify who threw it); Tr., Vol.4, p.329, Ls.6-7 (Mr. Storch admitting to throwing a 
chair at Mr. Detwiler's vehicle).) Mr. Detwiler was ultimately able to drive away, and 
was later arrested. 
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The charged Mr. Detwiler with Aggravated Battery with a deadly weapon 
for hitting Mr. Storch. (R., pp.50-51.) It also charged Mr. Detwiler with Aggravated 
Assault with a deadly weapon for driving at Ms. Haynes. (R., pp.50-51.) In making the 
aggravated assault allegation, the State only articulated a theory of assault-by-threat.2 
(R., p.51.) Finally, it charged Mr. Detwiler with Malicious Injury to Property. (R., p.51.) 
The matter ultimately went to trial. 
At trial, Mr. Detwiler requested that the district court instruct the jury on two 
defenses: self-defense and necessity. (Tr., Vol.4, p.351, Ls.15-23; Tr., Vol.4, p.429, 
L.5 - p.432, L.1; see also R., pp.128-35 (defense's proposed instructions on these 
defenses).) The district court instructed the jury as to self-defense. (R., pp.249-52.) 
However, it refused to give the necessity instruction. (Tr., Vol.4, p.351, Ls.15-23; 
Tr., Vol.4, p.433, L.18 - p.434, 3.) It based that decision on two different rationales. 
First, the district court decided that there was evidence demonstrating that the 
confrontation at Mr. Detwiler's car, as well as the confrontation inside the establishment, 
"could well have been brought about by the defendant. And I think that precludes the 
defense." (Tr., Vol.4, p.352, Ls.7-17.) Second, it asserted that "I am not entirely 
convinced that the defendant wishes to admit the illegal conduct occurred, and I think 
that's a crucial part of the defense of necessity .... " (Tr., Vol.4, p.352, Ls.18-23.) 
When it did instruct the jury, the district court also instructed on both theories of assault. 
(R., p.240.) 
2 Assault may be committed in one of two ways: (1) the defendant unlawfully 
attempted, with the apparent ability, to commit a violent injury on the person of another 
(hereinafter, assault-by-attempt); or (2) the defendant intentionally and unlawfully 
threatened by word or act to do violence to the person of another with the apparent 
ability to do so, and creates a well-founded fear in the other person that such violence is 
imminent (hereinafter, assault-by-threat). I.C. § 18-901. 
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The jury ultimately convicted Mr. Detwiler of Aggravated Battery and Aggravated 
Assault. (R., pp.218-20.) However, it acquitted Mr. Detwiler on the Malicious Injury to 
Property charge. (R., p.220.) 
At the sentencing hearing, defense counsel challenged various pieces of 
information that had been included in the presentence investigation report (hereinafter, 
PSI) as being unreliable. (Tr., Vol.5, p.24, L.14 - p.27, L.1.) However, the district court 
told defense counsel, "I'm not going to red-line or remove anything at this point. The 
PSI says what it says." (Tr., Vol.5, p.27, Ls.12-14; see also Tr., Vol.5, p.28, Ls.15-16 
("I'm not removing anything at this point from the PSI."). Originally, the district court said 
it would entertain challenges to the PSI at a subsequent hearing, but when defense 
counsel requested that the district court schedule such a hearing, the district court 
decided to allow defense counsel to explain why it should not consider the information 
in the PSI at the ongoing hearing instead. (Tr., Vol.5, p.27, L.3 - p.28, L.18.) 
Nevertheless, when defense counsel subsequently pointed out the unreliability of some 
of that information, the district court reiterated its decision to not remove information 
from the PSI. (See, e.g., Tr., Vol.5, p.29, L.25 - p.30, L.9.) Ultimately, the district court 
sentenced Mr. Detwiler to a unified sentence of five years, with three years fixed, for the 
aggravated assault, and a concurrent unified sentence of fifteen years, with three years 
fixed, for the aggravated battery. (R., p.263.) 
Owing to the ineffective assistance of counsel, Mr. Detwiler did not file a notice of 
appeal within forty-two days of that judgment of conviction. (See R., p.283.) However, 
he sought and received post-conviction relief, and the district court re-entered the 
judgment of conviction, which allowed Mr. Detwiler a new opportunity to file an appeal 
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in this case. (R., ) As such, he filed a timely notice of appeal from the re-entered 
judgment of conviction. (R., p.285.) 
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ISSUES 
1. Whether there was a fatal variance "'""'" the charging document and the jury 
instructions as they related to the charge of aggravated assault. 
Whether the district court erred by not instructing the jury as to the necessity 
defense. 
3. Whether the district court abused its discretion by refusing to allow Mr. Detwiler 
to challenge the information in the PSI, and by refusing to redline information 




There Was A Fatal Variance Between The Charging Document And The Jury 
Instructions As They Related To The Charge Of Aggravated Assault 
The Idaho Supreme Court has made it clear that "[t]he instructions to the jury 
must match the allegation in the charging document as to the means by which a 
defendant is alleged to have committed the crime charged. Othervvise, there can be a 
fatal variance between the jury instructions and the charging document." State v. Folk, 
151 Idaho 327, 342 (2011) (internal citation omitted). When trial counsel does not 
object to a variance, the defendant must satisfy the fundamental error test to obtain 
relief for the variance on appeal. See, e.g., State v. Day, 1 Idaho 476, 479 (Ct App. 
2013). To show fundamental error, the defendant must demonstrate that the 
error: 1) violated an unwaived constitutional right, 2) is clear from the record, and 
3) prejudiced him (i.e., the defendant must show that there is a reasonable possibility 
that the error contributed to the outcome of the trial). State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 226 
(2010). 
In this case, the variance exists as to the theory underlying the aggravated 
assault charge. The State alleged only an assault-by-threat theory in the information. 
(R., p.51.) However, the district court instructed the jury on two theories: assault-by-
threat and assault-by-attempt. (R., pp.240-41.) That variance deprived Mr. Detwiler of 
adequate notice as to the crime charge, and therefore, constituted a fatal variance. 
As to the first prong of the fundamental error test, the variance in this case 
impacted Mr. Detwiler's unwaived constitutional right to due process. See, e.g., 
Bergerv. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 82 (1935); State v. Windsor, 110 Idaho 410,417 
(1985). Variances are impermissible when they deprive the defendant of adequate 
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notice of the charges against him, and thereby, infringe on his right to due process. 
State v. Ormesher, 154 Idaho 1, (Ct. App. 2012). Basically, they are fatal when 
they constitute "constructive amendments" to the information, Day, 154 Idaho at 4 79, 
since "any amendment which charges the accused with a crime of greater degree or a 
different nature than that for which the accused was bound over for trial by the 
committing magistrate is barred by the Idaho Constitution." State v. Colwell, 124 
Idaho 560, 566 (Ct. App. 1993). In this case, the jury was instructed on a theory of the 
crime that was not alleged in the information. (Compare R., p.51 (information alleging 
only an assault-by-threat theory) with R., pp.240-41 Uury instructions on both an 
assault-by-threat and an assault-by-attempt theory).) By charging an additional theory 
of the crime, the instructions charged Mr. Detwiler with a crime of a different nature than 
that for which he had been bound over for trial by the committing magistrate. As a 
result, the variance in this case violated one of Mr. Detwiler's unwaived constitutional 
rights. 
As to the second prong of the fundamental error test, the variance is clear from 
the face of the record: the jury instructions contain a theory of the crime that was not 
alleged in the information. The information alleged that Mr. Detwiler had committed 
aggravated assault-by-threat: 
That the Defendant ... did intentionally, unlawfully and with apparent 
ability threaten by act to do violence upon the person of Ashley Haynes, 
with a deadly weapon, to-wit: by intentionally accelerating his [vehicle] 
toward Ashley Haynes and speeding towards her person as she stood in 
front of the car, which created a well-founded fear in Ashley Haynes that 
such violence was imminent. 
(R., p.51.) As such, the instruction on aggravated assault provided in relevant part: 
In order for the defendant to be guilty of aggravated assault, the state 
must prove each of the following: ... 
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3. the defendant Michael Clay Detwiler committed an 
assault upon Ashley Haynes 
4. by intentionally accelerating his [vehicle] toward 
Ashley Haynes and speeding towards her person as 
she stood in front of the [vehicle] .... 
(R., p.241.) However, in defining assault for the jury, the district court instructed on both 
the assault-by-threat and the assault-by-attempt theories: 
An "assault" is committed when a person: (1) unlawfully attempts, with 
apparent ability, to commit a violent injury on the person of another; or 
(2) intentionally and unlawfully threatens by word or act to do violence to 
the person of another, with an apparent ability to do so, and does some 
act which creates a well-founded fear in the other person that such 
violence is imminent. 
(R., p.240.) Thus, the additional theory of the offense, which appears in the jury 
instructions but not in the information, constitutes clear error on the face of the record. 
As to the third prong of the fundamental error test, the error prejudiced 
Mr. Detwiler because there is a reasonable possibility that the variance impacted the 
verdict in this case. As the Idaho Supreme Court has held, if an instruction presents 
two legal theories, only one of which is correct and "it is not possible to determine if the 
jury reached the verdict on the correct or incorrect legal theory, this Court must vacate 
the conviction and remand the case for a new trial." State v. Luke, 134 Idaho 294, 301 
(2000). Since it is not possible to determine on which theory the jury convicted 
Mr. Detwiler, there is a reasonable possibility that the variance impacted the verdict in 
this case. 
In fact, the jury sent a question to the judge during its deliberations asking about 
the intent element of assault. (Exhibits, p.28.)3 That question explicitly identified the 
3 Exhibit page numbers correspond with the page numbers of the electronic PDF 
document "DETWILER ex." The exhibits admitted at trial, as well as the court exhibits 
and jury questions, are reproduced in this document. 
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instruction which contained the variance, and reveals that at least one of the jurors had 
reservations about the evidence presented on the aggravated assault charge: "As to 
Instruction No. 20 [the definition of assault], does the intent associated with assault 
have to be to injure Ashley? If we believe that Ashley was a bystander and not the 
intended target of the vehicle, has the intent portion of the statute been met?" (Exhibits, 
p.28 (emphasis added).) Basically, the jurors asked if they could convict Mr. Detwiler of 
aggravate assault if they believed that Mr. Detwiler was not intending to threaten or 
trying to hit Ms. Haynes. Therefore, the erroneous instruction was definitely at issue in 
the deliberations process. Thus, there is a reasonable possibility that the erroneous 
instruction, which gave the jury broader grounds on which return a guilty verdict than 
set forth in the charging document, contributed to that guilty verdict. 
As a result, the variance in this case constitutes fundamental error. Additionally, 
because the variance deprived Mr. Detwiler of sufficient notice, it is a fatal variance. As 
such, this Court should vacate the judgment of conviction as to the aggravated assault 
charge and remand this case for a new trial. 
11. 
The District Court Erred By Not Instructing The Jury As To The Necessity Defense 
The district court is required to give requested instructions if a reasonable view of 
the evidence supports the requested instruction. See, e.g., State v. Howley, 128 Idaho 
874, 878 (1996); State v. Tadlock, 136 Idaho 413,414 (Ct. App. 2001) ("A defendant in 
a criminal action is entitled to have his legal theory of defense submitted to the jury 
through an instruction if there is a reasonable view of the evidence which would support 
the theory."). The district court may properly refuse to give a requested instruction on 
the necessity defense when there is no evidence presented in support of one of the 
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elements of that defense. e.g., State v. Korn, 148 Idaho 413, 417-18 (2009) 
(holding that the necessity instruction had been properly withheld because defendant 
had not presented evidence that he was acting to avoid a reasonably perceived specific 
threat of immediate harm); Howley, 128 Idaho at 879 (holding that the necessity 
instruction was properly withheld because there was no evidence that defendants were 
acting to avoid a reasonably perceived specific threat of immediate harm, and there was 
no evidence that harm could have been avoided by a less offensive means). However, 
where there is conflicting evidence as to the elements of the necessity defense, 
resolution of that conflict is a question for the jury, and so, the jury should be instructed 
on the in such cases. v. Hastings, 118 Idaho 854, 856 {1990) (holding 
that the defendant was "entitled to present evidence at trial on the common law defense 
of necessity. It is for the trier of fact to determine whether or not she has met the 
elements of that defense"). 
The defense has the burden of production when it seeks to raise the necessity 
defense (the State ultimately bears the burden of proof). See I.C.J.I. 1512. As such, for 
the defense to properly request an instruction on necessity, the evidence must show: 
"1. A specific threat of immediate harm; 2. The circumstances which necessitate the 
illegal action must not have been brought about by the defendant; 3. The same 
objective could not have been accomplished by a less offensive alternative available to 
the actor; 4. The harm caused was not disproportionate to the harm avoided." Hastings, 
118 Idaho at 855. Evidence was presented in support of each element of the necessity 
defense, and thus, a reasonable view of the evidence supported the requested 
instruction on that defense. 
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There was evidence of a specific threat of imminent harm. Mr. Detwiler testified 
that a group of men had approached his car and were trying to get him out of the car 
(the implication being that they wanted to fight him), and that one of them actually 
kicked the door of his car. (Tr., Vol.4, p.384, Ls.8-10.) Ms. Haynes confirmed that a 
group of men had gathered around Mr. Detwiler's car and that it was "a bit chaotic." 
(Tr., Vol.4, p.200, Ls.17-25.) She also testified that it would not have been safe for 
Mr. Detwiler to get out of his car.4 (Tr., Vol.4, p.260, Ls.12-16.) One of the officers who 
investigated this incident also confirmed that, "[i]t appears that there was some sort of 
footprint or scuff from a shoe or a boot on the door." (Tr., Vol.4, p.342, Ls.15-17.) A 
reasonable view of the evidence indicates that Mr. Detwiler was in danger of being 
physically attacked by a group of people, which obviously constitutes a specific threat 
of immediate threat. 
There was evidence that Mr. Detwiler did not bring about the actions leading to 
the necessity (i.e., the attack by the group of men outside the bar), since, as defense 
counsel pointed out, there was no evidence of a confrontation between Mr. Detwiler 
and the group that attacked him at his car. (Tr., Vol.4, p.430, Ls.12-15.) If Mr. Detwiler 
did not confront that group of people in the bar, it is a reasonable conclusion that 
Mr. Detwiler's actions did not lead to their attack outside. To that point, Mr. Detwiler 
testified that he had packed up his belongings and left the bar when asked, though he 
did so angrily, and that he was in his car preparing to leave when the group came to 
assault him. (Tr., Vol.4, p.381, L.5 - p.383, L.16.) Ms. Haynes also testified that the 
4 Ms. Haynes' testimony that it was not safe for Mr. Detwiler to get out of the car also 
demonstrates that Mr. Detwiler's fear of injury was reasonable. Compare Korn, 148 
Idaho at 417-18 (finding a necessity instruction was properly excluded when there was 
no evidence that the perception of harm was objectively reasonable); Howley, 128 
Idaho at 879 (same). 
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group of people went outside after she had escorted Mr. Detwiler outside. (Tr., Vol.4, 
p.1 Ls.1 1 ) One reasonable view of this evidence is that Ms. Haynes had 
managed to quell the situation in the bar and Mr. Detwiler was leaving, and that the 
group of men who went out after Mr. Detwiler did so to start a new confrontation. (See 
Tr., Vol.4, p.430, Ls.5-19.) In that case, a reasonable view of the evidence shows that 
Mr. Detwiler did not facilitate the assault which occurred at his car. As that was the 
incident giving rise to the necessity and the allegedly-criminal conduct, that evidence 
supports the second element of the necessity defense. 
There was evidence that Mr. Detwiler could not have escaped the situation by 
some less offensive means, as Ms. Haynes testified the presence of that group of 
assailants meant it would not have been for Mr. Detwiler to have left the car. 
(Tr., Vol.4, p.260, Ls.12-16.) As such, the only option available to Mr. Detwiler was to 
try and drive away. Furthermore, Mr. Detwiler testified that someone had come up and 
opened his driver side door, and was trying to drag him out of the car. (Tr., Vol.4, 
p.386, Ls.9-14.) He also testified that he tried to drive away in reverse, and that effort 
failed to end the threat. (Tr., Vol.4, p.386, Ls.14 - p.387, L.2.) As such, reversing away 
from the parking area was not an option that would allow Mr. Detwiler to escape the 
threatened harm. (See Tr., Vol.4, p.430, L.20 - p.431, L.3.) Therefore, there is a 
reasonable view of the evidence that there was not a less offensive option for 
Mr. Detwiler to have taken. 
There was evidence that the harm caused was not disproportionate to the harm 
avoided. Mr. Storch testified that the only injury he received was a twisted hip, which 
had some impact on his ability to work, but did not stop him from working. (Tr., Vol.4, 
p.316, L.17 - p.317, L.21.) Ms. Haynes also testified that she was sore after the 
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encounter, but that it was not anything that would cause her to medical attention. 
(Tr., Vol.4, p.262, L.11 - p.263, L.1.) Mr. Detwiler, on the other hand, testified that he 
had suffered a head injury in a fall a few months before the incident, and as part of the 
treatment for that, doctors had removed part of his skull. (Tr., Vol.4, p.367, L.17 p.369, 
L.3.) He also testified that, as part of his recovery, he had been told to avoid situations 
which risked injuries to his head, and he was concerned that being hit in the head 
during a fight would lead to a severe head injury because of his particular condition. 
(Tr., Vol.4, p.382, Ls.17-21; Tr., Vol.4, p.384, Ls.11-17.) Therefore, there is a 
reasonable view of the evidence that a twisted hip and general soreness is not 
disproportionate to being beaten up by a mob risking complications to a recent, still-
healing head injury. 
Since there was a reasonable view of the evidence supporting the necessity 
defense, the district court needed to give that instruction. Howley, 128 Idaho at 878; 
Tadlock, 136 Idaho at 414. Its refusal to do so was based on two rationales, neither of 
which justifies its failure to give the merited instruction. As to the district court's first 
rationale - that the defense was precluded because Mr. Detwiler's actions "could well 
have" led to the confrontation by his car (Tr., Vol.4, p.352, Ls.7-17)- the district court's 
conclusion that the circumstances "could well have been brought about by the 
defendant" indicates that there was evidence to the contrary in the record which 
suggested that Mr. Detwiler's actions may not have brought about the confrontation at 
the car. The fact that there was conflicting evidence as to that element of the necessity 
defense does not justify not instructing the jury as to that defense. See Hastings, 118 
Idaho at 856 ("It is for the trier of fact to determine whether or not [the defendant] has 
met the elements of that defense."). Only when there is no evidence offered as to one 
15 
of the elements of the defense is such a decision justified. Korn, 148 Idaho at 417-
1 Howley, 128 Idaho at 879. Resolving the conflicting evidence in this regard requires 
a determination regarding the credibility of the witnesses and the evidence presented, 
and it is the jury, not the district court, that is tasked with making that determination. 
See, e.g., State v. Almaraz, 154 Idaho 584, 599 (2013); State v. Allen, 129 Idaho 556, 
558 (1996). As a result, the district court erred by deciding not to give a justified 
instruction based on its own determination of the facts in this case, a decision which 
usurped the jury's function in Mr. Detwiler's trial. 
The district court's second rationale for not giving the requested instruction that 
Mr. Detwiler might not want to admit that the illegal conduct occurred (Tr., Vol.4, p.352, 
18-23) - is also baseless, particularly in light of the that the district court did 
instruct the jury on self-defense. As defenses, both self-defense and necessity 
constitute justifications for the allegedly-criminal conduct, which means, if the defense is 
proved, the defendant will not be punished for what would ordinarily be a criminal act. 
See State v. Barton, 154 Idaho 289, 292 (2013). 
In Barton, the Idaho Supreme Court held that the entrapment defense is 
unavailable where the defendant does not admit the underlying criminal offense. See 
Barton, 154 Idaho at 292. However, that appears to a product of the unique nature of 
the entrapment defense: "Entrapment occurs when 'an otherwise innocent person, not 
inclined to commit a criminal offense, is induced to do so by a State agent who, desiring 
grounds for prosecution, originates the criminal design and implants in the mind of the 
innocent person the disposition to commit the alleged offense."' State v. Koller, 122 
Idaho 409, 411 (1992) (quoting State v. Hansen, 105 Idaho 816, 817 n. 1 (1983)) 
(emphasis added). Unlike entrapment, necessity does not require that the defendant 
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engage in criminal conduct. See Hastings, 118 Idaho at 855; I.C.J.I. 151 Therefore, 
idea that the defendant must admit a criminal act is inappropriately applied in the 
necessity context 
In fact, that distinction is of less consequence in this case, as Mr. Detwiler 
expressly admitted some of the underlying conduct, as he testified that he did drive 
forward. 5 (Tr., Vol.4, p.386, L.17 - p.387, L.12; compare Tr., Vol.4, p.437, Ls.1-1 O 
(describing the intentional act that the prosecution has focused on to be Mr. Detwiler's 
act of driving forward).) Therefore, Mr. Detwiler's testimony reveals that he was not 
overly concerned, as a trial strategy, with admitting that the underlying conduct 
occurred. Rather, it appears that he was asserting that he did not have the necessary 
mens rea to be found guilty - he did not intentionally hit Mr. Storch and he did not 
intentionally threaten Ms. Haynes. To that end, he was contending that his actions were 
justified as a matter of law based on the defenses of self-defense and necessity. There 
was a reasonable view of the evidence that his actions were justified by the doctrine of 
necessity, and therefore, the district court's second rationale was unfounded in the law. 
That is particularly true since the same concern would apply to self-defense as 
well. Necessity and self-defense share a similar theory - the defendant's actions are 
justified because they were made in response to a threat to the defendant. Since the 
district court gave the self-defense instruction, its concern about admitting the 
underlying conduct was completely unfounded; such an admission was obviously 
evident in the record since the district court had no corresponding concerns with the 
proposed self-defense instruction. 
5 Since Mr. Detwiler did admit the actus reus, there was no basis in fact for the district 
court's decision to not give the necessity instruction because Mr. Detwiler would have to 
admit the underlying conduct occurred. (See Tr., Vol.4, p.352, Ls.18-23.) 
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Because the district court erroneously refused to give a requested necessity 
instruction, which was supported by a reasonable view of the evidence, this Court 
should vacate the judgment of conviction as to both the aggravated battery and 
aggravated assault and remand this case for a new trial. 
111. 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Refusing To Allow Mr. Detwiler To 
Challenge The Information In The PSI. And By Refusing To Redline Information 
Improperly Included Therein 
The district court's denial of a motion to strike or delete portions of a PSI is 
reviewed for abuse of discretion. I.C.R. 32(c); State v. Molen, 148 Idaho 950, 961 
App. 2010). Defense counsel made several challenges to the information in the 
I materials and requested that all the unreliable information be stricken or red-lined 
from the PSI. (Tr., Vol.5, p.6, Ls.10-21; Tr., Vol.5, p.24, L.14 - p.27, L.1.) The district 
court stopped defense counsel and declared "I'm not going to red-line or remove 
anything at this point. The PSI says what it says." (Tr., Vol.5, p.27, Ls.12-14; see also 
Tr., Vol.5, p.28, Ls.15-16 ('Tm not removing anything at this point from the PSI."). 
That decision constitutes an abuse of discretion, since "it is at the sentencing 
hearing-and not beyond-that the defendant is given the opportunity to object to [the 
PSl's] contents." State v. Person, 145 Idaho 293, 296 (Ct. App. 2007). When the 
defendant demonstrates that information is erroneously included in the PSI, that 
information needs to be culled from the PSI. See State v. Mauro, 121 Idaho 178, 183 
(1991 ). The best practice to effectuate the removal of the erroneous information is to 
red-line the PSI. State v. Rodriguez, 132 Idaho 261 n.1 (Ct. App. 1998). The reason 
the district court needs to remove erroneously-included information at the sentencing 
hearing is to prevent it being used against the defendant at subsequent hearings. Id. 
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Therefore, Idaho's appellate cou have held, the district court needs to give the 
defendant an adequate opportunity to explain or rebut adverse information in the PSI. 
Mauro, 121 Idaho at 183; Molen, 148 Idaho at 961. 
If, as here, the district court fails to provide an adequate opportunity for the 
defendant to challenge the information in the record or fails to remove the unreliable 
information from the PSI, the sentence should be vacated and the case remanded for a 
new sentencing hearing conducted with a proper PSI. Mauro, 121 Idaho at 183; 
Rodriguez, 132 Idaho at 262. Therefore, because the district court abused its discretion 
by not red-lining or otherwise removing the improperly-included information from the PSI 
at the sentencing hearing, this Court should, at least, vacate Mr. Detwiler's sentence 
and remand for a new sentencing determination. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Detwiler respectfully requests that this Court vacate his judgment of 
conviction and remand this case for a new trial. Alternatively, he requests that this 
Court vacate his sentence and remand the case for a new sentencing hearing with 
instruction to allow him an adequate opportunity to challenge the information in the PSI 
materials. 
DATED this 26th day of June, 2014. 
BRIAN R. DICKSON 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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